��We describe a comprehensive framework for text un- derstanding, based on the representation of context. It is designed to serve as a representation of semantics for the full range of in- terpretive and inferential needs of general natural language pro- cessing. Its most distinctive feature is its uniform representation of the various simple and independent linguistic sources that play a role in determining meaning: lexical associations, syntactic re- strictions, case-role expectations, and most importantly, contextual effects. Compositional syntactic structure from a (...) shallow parsing is represented in a neural net-based associative memory, where it then interacts through a Bayesian network with semantic associa- tions and the context or “gist” of the passage carried forward from preceding sentences. Experiments with more than 2000 sentences in different languages are included. (shrink)

In many cases of criminality within large corporations, senior management does not commit the operative offense—or conspire or assist in it—but nonetheless bears serious responsibility for the crime. That responsibility can derive from, among other things, management’s role in cultivating corporate culture, in failing to police effectively within the firm, and in accepting lavish compensation for taking the firm’s reins. Criminal law does not include any doctrinal means for transposing that form of responsibility into punishment. Arguments for expanding doctrine—including broadening (...) of the presently narrow “responsible corporate officer” doctrine—so as to authorize such punishment do not fare well under the justificatory demands of criminal law theory. The principal obstacle to such arguments is the large industrial corporation itself, which necessarily entails kinds and degrees of delegation and risk-taking that do not fit well with settled concepts about mens rea and omission liability. Even the most egregious and harmful management failures must be addressed through design and regulation of the corporation rather than imposition of individual criminal liability. (shrink)

Spirituality is a universal human experience. Within the process of development, the role of spirituality as a developmental asset is understudied in general and especially within majority world contexts. In this article, we frame advances in spirituality research and practice with youth around three pillars: (a) theory, (b) measurement, and (c) research about and evaluations of positive youth development (PYD) programs in low- and middle-income countries. We place PYD programs as associated with dynamic, relational developmental systems (RDS)-based models of human (...) development, describe spirituality and the “Big Three” features of effective PYD programs as aligning to promote thriving, and discuss spirituality as a strength, as a key asset, in the lives of youth. We discuss advances in developmental methods and measures for describing, explaining, and promoting spirituality and PYD and offer a case study that responds to a United States Agency for International Development call for action and evaluations of spirituality within the context of a PYD program in the majority world. Considerations for future research about spirituality and youth development are discussed. (shrink)

Ethical codes help guide the methods of research that involves samples gathered from ?at-risk? populations. The current article reviews general as well as specific ethical principles related to gathering informed consent from partner violent offenders mandated to outpatient treatment, a group that may be at increased risk of unintentional coercion in behavioral sciences research due to court mandates that require outpatient treatment without the ethical protections imbued upon prison populations. Recommendations are advanced to improve the process of informed consent within (...) this special population and data supporting the utility of the recommendations in a sample 70 partner violent offenders are provided. Data demonstrate that participants were capable of comprehending all essential elements of consent. (shrink)

The rate‐limiting step in the uptake and metabolism of Dglucose by insulin target cells is thought to be glucose transport mediated by glucose transporters (primarily the GLUT4 isoform) localized to the plasma membrane. However, subcellular fractionation, photolabelling and immunocytochemical studies have shown that the pool of GLUT4 present in the plasma membrane is only one of many subcellular pools of this protein. GLUT4 has been found in occluded vesicles at the plasma membrane, clathrin‐coated pits and vesicles, early endosomes, and tubulo‐vesicular (...) structures; the latter are analogous to known specialized secretory compartments. Tracking the movement of GLUT4 through these compartments, and defining the mechanism and site of action of insulin in stimulating this subcellular trafficking, are major topics of current investigation. Recent evidence focuses attention on the exocytosis of GLUT4 as the major site of insulin action. Increased exocytosis may be due to decreased retention of glucose transporters in an intracellular pool, or possibly to increased assembly of a vesicle docking and fusion complex. Although details are unknown, the presence in GLUT4 vesicles of a synaptobrevin homologue leads us to propose that a process analogous to that occurring in synaptic vesicle trafficking is involved in the assembly of GLUT4 vesicles into a form suitable for fusion with the plasma membrane. Evidence that the pathways of signalling from the insulin receptor and of GLUT4 vesicle exocytosis may converge at the level of the key signalling enzyme, phosphatidylinositol 3‐kinase, is discussed. (shrink)

A new translation of two essential works on Deleuze, written by one of his contemporaries. From the publication of Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event to his untimely death in 2006, Francois Zourabichvili was regarded as one of the most important new voices of contemporary philosophy in France. His work continues to make an essential contribution to Deleuze scholarship today. This edition makes two of Zourabichvili's most important writings on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze available in a single volume. A (...) Philosophy of the Event is an exposition of Deleuze's philosophy as a whole, while the complementary Deleuze's Vocabulary approaches Deleuze's work through an analysis of key concepts in a dictionary form. This new translation is set to become an event within Deleuze Studies for many years to come. Key Features: Distinguishes Deleuze's notion of the event from the phenomenological, ontological and voluntarist conceptions that continue to lay claim to it today; With an introduction by Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith, two of the world's leading commentators on Deleuze, explaining the key themes and arguments of Zourabichvili's work. (shrink)

This book is an important contribution to the Values literature on the meanings of work. These essays explore the philosophical, ethical, religious, and social foundations that underscore so much of the current thinking and concern about work satisfaction and the place of work in the search of meaning. Various points of view are presented and these include among others historical perspectives, empirical studies and cross-cultural explorations. The result is a compelling and critical volume which challenges many basic cultural and empirical (...) assumptions and raises many questions about values and value-based decisions. (shrink)

In the U.S.A., advocates of academic freedom—the ability to pursue research unencumbered by government controls—have long found sparring partners in government officials who regulate technology trade. From concern over classified research in the 1950s, to the expansion of export controls to cover trade in information in the 1970s, to current debates over emerging technologies and global innovation, the academic community and the government have each sought opportunities to demarcate the sphere of their respective authority and autonomy and assert themselves in (...) that sphere. In this paper, we explore these opportunities, showing how the Social Contract for Science set the terms for the debate, and how the controversy turned to the proper interpretation of this compact. In particular, we analyze how the 1985 presidential directive excluding fundamental research from export controls created a boundary object that successfully demarcated science and the state, but only for a Cold War world that would soon come to an end. Significant changes have occurred since then in the governance structures of science and in the technical and political environment within which both universities and the state sit. Even though there have been significant and persistent calls for reassessing the Cold War demarcation, a new institutionalization of how to balance the concerns of national security and academic freedom is still only in its nascent stages. We explore the value of moving from a boundary object to a boundary organization, as represented in a proposed new governance body, the Science and Security Commission. (shrink)

This book is a collection of reflections and empirical studies which examine the many facets of the meanings of work. The authors are significant scholars in fields of study ranging from ethics to sociology. The book is a text which aims at balancing the academic with the practical and so the chapters often reflect the tensions implicit in such a venture. The reader will find in these pages historical, philosophical, educational, religious, entrepreneurial and many other points of view which combine (...) to emerge as a text which is both encyclopedic in information yet engaging and lively in style. The reader will be able to understand how the meanings of work have changed over the centuries varying according to historical place and point of view. At the same time, the diligent reader will observe the centrality that work has in the lives of people both practically and in terms of life quests. Work has previously been defined as an activity that produces something of value for other people. This definition does not even begin to include the information about work that is presented in this book. The reader will feel a invigorating sense of worth from this book. (shrink)

An important part of our Theory of Mind—the ability to reason about other people's unobservable mental states—is the ability to attribute false beliefs to others. We investigated whether processing these false beliefs, as well as similar but nonmental representations, is reliant on language. Participants watched videos in which a protagonist hides a gift and either takes a photo of it or writes a text about its location before a second person inadvertently moves the present to a different location, thereby rendering (...) the belief and either the photo or text false. At the same time, participants performed either a concurrent verbal interference task (rehearsing strings of digits) or a visual interference task (remembering a visual pattern). Results showed that performance on false belief trials did not decline under verbal interference relative to visual interference. We interpret these findings as further support for the view that language does not form an essential part of the process of reasoning online (“in the moment”) about false beliefs. (shrink)

The current research aims to answer the following question: “who will be held responsible for harm involving an artificial intelligence system?” Drawing upon the literature on moral judgments, we assert that when people perceive an AI system’s action as causing harm to others, they will assign blame to different entity groups involved in an AI’s life cycle, including the company, the developer team, and even the AI system itself, especially when such harm is perceived to be intentional. Drawing upon the (...) theory of mind perception, we hypothesized that two dimensions of mind: perceived agency—attributing intention, reasoning, pursuing goals, and communicating to AI, and perceived experience—attributing emotional states, such as feeling pain and pleasure, personality, and consciousness to AI—mediated the relationship between perceived intentional harm and blame judgments toward AI. We also predicted that people are likely to attribute higher mind characteristics to AI when harm is perceived to be directed to humans than when it is perceived to be directed to non-humans. We tested our research model in three experiments. In all experiments, we found that perceived intentional harm led to blame judgments toward AI. In two experiments, we found perceived experience, not agency, mediated the relationship between perceived intentional harm and blame judgments. We also found that companies and developers were held responsible for moral violations involving AI, with developers received the most blame among the entities involved. Our third experiment reconciles the findings by showing that perceived intentional harm directed to a non-human entity did not lead to increased attributions of mind to AI. These findings have implications for theory and practice concerning unethical outcomes and behavior associated with AI use. (shrink)

In this article, we describe four theoretical and methodological problems that have impeded implicit attitude research and the popular understanding of its findings. The problems all revolve around assumptions made about the relationships among measures, constructs, cognitive processes, and features of processing. These assumptions have confused our understandings of exactly what we are measuring, the processes that produce implicit evaluations, the meaning of differences in implicit evaluations across people and contexts, the meaning of changes in implicit evaluations in response to (...) intervention, and how implicit evaluations predict behavior. We describe formal modeling as one means to address these problems, and provide illustrative examples. Clarifying these issues has important implications for our understanding of who has particular implicit evaluations and why, when those evaluations are likely to be particularly problematic, how we might best try to change them, and what interventions are best suited to minimize the effects of implicit evaluations on behavior. (shrink)

The physiological blind spot corresponds to the optic disc where the retina contains no light-detecting photoreceptor cells. Our perception seemingly fills in this gap in input. Here we suggest that rather than an active process, such perceptual filling-in could instead be a consequence of the integration of visual inputs at higher stages of processing discounting the local absence of retinal input. Using functional brain imaging, we resolved the retinotopic representation of the physiological blind spot in early human visual cortex and (...) measured responses while participants perceived filling-in. Responses in early visual areas simply reflected the absence of visual input. In contrast, higher extrastriate regions responded more to stimuli in the eye containing the blind spot than the fellow eye. However, this signature was independent of filling-in. We argue that these findings agree with philosophical accounts that posit that the concept of filling-in of absent retinal input is unnecessary. (shrink)

We argue that the dual-system approach and, particularly, the default-interventionist framework favored by De Neys unnecessarily constrains process models, limiting their range of application. In turn, the accommodations De Neys makes for these constraints raise questions of parsimony and falsifiability. We conclude that the extent to which processes possess features of system 1 versus system 2 must be tested empirically.